Abstract. The literature on definitions of security based on causalitylike notions such as noninterference has used several distinct semantic models for systems. Early work was based on state-machine and traceset definitions; more recent work has dealt with definitions of security in two distinct process algebraic settings. Comparisons between the definitions has been carried out mainly within semantic frameworks. This paper studies the relationship between semantic frameworks, by defining mappings between a number of semantic models and studying the relationship between notions of noninterference under these mappings.
Introduction
"Noninterference" is a term loosely applied in the literature to a class of formal security properties motivated from considerations of information flow and causality. Since it was invented in [1] , several distinct schools have produced a variety of generalizations of the original notion, each based on their own approach to modelling systems. Existing definitions of noninterference can be roughly classified by whether they are framed in the semantic context of state-based automaton models [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , trace-based models [7] [8] [9] [10] , or process algebraic based models (further divisible into CSP and CCS based variants) [11] [12] [13] .
There have been a number of survey works and studies of the relationships between these definitions in the individual schools [13, 11] , but on the whole, these comparisons have been carried out within rather than across semantic frameworks. The only cross-domain work in our knowledge is [14] , in which language-based security has been connected with a particular process algebraic property by a one-way translation. In this paper, we attempt to bridge some of the gaps by considering the relationships between the various semantic models and some of the proposed notions of noninterference. We consider three types of models: two automaton-like models (introduced in Section 2) and a process algebraic framework (discussed in Section 5). The semantic intuitions underlying these frameworks are somewhat different. The automaton models have notions of "action" and of "observation" that is a function of state in one case and associated to actions in the other. The process algebraic framework is seemingly more general, but diverges from the intuitions of the automaton models in that it treats both actions(outputs) and observations(inputs) uniformly as "active". However, the state-observed automaton models rather than the process algebraic models are what is used in current work in operating systems verification [15, 16] -the application originally motivating the literature on noninterference -so it is desirable to precisely understand the relationship between these frameworks. We address this question by defining formal mappings (see Sections 4 and 5) between the semantic frameworks. We study whether a variety of definitions of noninterference (introduced for the automaton models in Section 3 ) in the different frameworks correspond under these mappings.
State-Based Models
The original system models used in the literature on noninterference modelled systems as a type of deterministic or nondeterministic automaton, with outputs for each of the security domains. Similarly to the Moore-Mealy distinction for finite state automata, we find two types of models, depending on whether outputs are associated to states [5, 6] or actions [1, 4] . The original definitions assumed deterministic systems, but the focus on subsequent work has been on how to generalize the definitions to nondeterministic systems. In general, these systems are input-enabled, in the sense that any action can be taken at any time.
A nondeterministic action-observed state machine is a tuple of the form M = S, s 0 , next, d om, A , where S is a set of states, s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of actions, d om : A → D associates with each action a security domain from the set of security domains D, and next : S × A → P(O × S) is a transition function. Here O is a set of observations that can be made when performing an action. Given a state s ∈ S, and an action a ∈ A, the set next(s, a) is required to be non-empty. A tuple (o, t) ∈ next(s, a) intuitively represents that on action a it is possible to make a transition from state s to state t and produce output o. Such a machine is deterministic if next(s, a) is a singleton for all states s and actions a. In this case, the function next may be replaced by two functions step : S × A → S and out : S × A → O such that next(s, a) = {(out(s, a), step(s, a))} to obtain the state machine one finds, e.g. in [4] . We write M na for the set of all nondeterministic action-observed state machines and M a for the set of deterministic action-observed state machines. A run M ∈ M na of an action-observed system is a sequence r = s 0 (a
. A nondeterministic state-observed state machine is a tuple of the form M = S, s 0 , next, obs, d om, A where S is a set of states; s 0 ∈ S is the initial state; the function next : S × A → P(S) is a transition function, such that next(s, a) defines the set of states to which it is possible to make a transition when action a ∈ A is performed at a state s ∈ S; the function d om : A → D associates a security domain with each action, and the function obs : S × D → O describes the observation made in each state by each security domain. For readability, we 'curry' the function obs by obs u of type S → O if u ∈ D. Such a state-machine is deterministic if next(s, a) is a singleton for all states s and actions a. In this case we may define a function step : S × A → S by next(s, a) = {step(s, a)}.
We write M ns for the set of all nondeterministic state observed machines, and M s for the set of all deterministic state-observed machines. A run of a stateobserved system is a sequence r = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 . . . a n s n ∈ S(AS)
* such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, s i ∈ next(s i−1 ). (Here we omit representation of the observations since these may be recovered using the function obs.)
The most significant apparent difference between state and action observed machines is that, in the former, all agents make an observation when an action is performed, whereas in the latter, only the agent performing the action does so. Since the execution model is asynchronous, this means that whereas in action observed systems, other agents would, unless they themselves act, have no knowledge that any agent has performed an action, they may come to have this information in state observed systems even without acting. However, such a situation would often be a reason for the system to be declared insecure. The action-observed setting somewhat resembles the process algebraic setting of [17] where agents have to perform actions to synchronise with the system to achieve the effect of 'observation', but differs from it in that it bundles actions together with observations whereas [17] has separate notions of 'input' and 'output' actions.
Security Properties on State-Based Models
We now recall from the literature a number of security properties in the two types of state-based systems. We study the relationships between these properties in section 4.
Noninterference
Historically, one of the first information flow properties was (transitive) noninterference [1, 18] , defined with respect to deterministic machines. We base our discussion on the presentation of Rushby [4] , which has been followed in many other works. Rushby defines both state-observed and action observed systems, but treats them independently and does not consider any direct relations between the two. The classical definitions were cast in terms of security policies describing permitted information flows between an arbitrary collection of agents. Much of the subsequent literature restricts attention to the policy L ≤ H with two agents High (H) and Low (L), with information permitted to flow from Low to High but not from High to Low. For uniformity, we also make this restriction here.
As noted above, in both state-observed and action-observed deterministic systems, we have a function step : S × A → S to represent the deterministic state evolution as a result of actions. To represent the result of executing a sequence of actions, define the operation
With respect to the simple policy L ≤ H, the definition of noninterference can be described in terms of the operation purge L : A * → A * on sequences of actions that restricts the sequence to the subsequence of actions of L. Intuitively, the purged High actions are not allowed to lead to any effects observable to L. This is formalised as follows in the definitions of noninterference following the spirit of [4] , one for each type of system. Definition 1.
1. A system in M na satisfies noninterference if it is deterministic and for all
. We write N I a for the set of such systems.
2. A system in M ns satisfies noninterference if it is deterministic and if for all
. We write N I s for the set of such systems.
The definitions of noninterference in the two types of system are very similar. We show below that they can be seen to be equivalent in a precise sense.
Nondeducibility on Inputs
One way of understanding the statement that H does not interfere with L in a deterministic system is as stating that every sequence of H actions is compatible with the actions and observations of L. This leads to the proposal to take a similar notion as the formulation of noninterference in nondeterministic systems: an approach known as nondeducibility [19] . Nondeducibility is defined in a quite general way, in terms of a pair of views of runs. We focus here on a commonly used special case: Low's nondeducibility of High's actions.
We take an agent u's view view u (r) of a run r to be the maximal state of information that it can have in an asynchronous system: its sequence of actions and observations reduced modulo stuttering. We begin by extending the agent's observations to runs. In action observed systems we define the extended observation function Obs
otherwise.
Here, taking the stance that an agent is aware of each action that it performs (so that if it performs an action twice, obtaining the same output, it knows that it has performed the action twice) we do not need to apply a stuttering reduction, and take view u (r) = Obs a u (r). In state observed systems, the agent makes an observation at each state, and we define Obs :
Here the agent may make the same observation several times in a row, without an intervening action by that agent. This indicates that another agent has acted. To eliminate this timing-based reasoning, in order to make the definition compatible with the assumption of asynchrony, we may take the view to be view u (r) = Cond (Obs(r)) where Cond is the function on sequences that removes consecutive repetitions.
To state the definition of nondeducibility, we also require a function to extract the sequence of actions performed by an agent. We write Act u (r) for the sequence of actions performed by agent u in run r, and Act(r) the whole sequence from all the agents in r.
Definition 2. A system M satisfies Nondeducibility on Inputs if for every α ∈ H * , and every observation sequence β such that there exists a run r of M with view L (r) = β, there exists a run r of M with Act H (r ) = α and view L (r ) = β.
Write N DI s and N DI a for the set of systems in M ns and M na (respectively) satisfying nondeducibility on inputs.
Nondeducibility on Strategies
Wittbold and Johnson [2] argued that systems classified as secure by nondeducibility on inputs may nevertheless permit flows of information flow from High to Low. They present a system in which by selecting its actions according to a particular strategy, High may directly control Low's observations. They propose an alternate definition they call "nondeducibility on strategies" which behaves more satisfactorily on the example.
The framework in which they work is synchronous state machines with simultaneous actions. Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate a similar definition in the asynchronous models defined above. In state-observed systems, we define an asynchronous High strategy to be a function π :
We say that a run s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a n s n is consistent with π if dom(a i ) = H implies a i = π(view H (s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a i−1 s i−1 )). Similarly, in action-observed systems, we define an asynchronous High strategy to be a function π :
). Given a system M ∈ M na or M ∈ M ns and a strategy π of the appropriate type, define
It is evident that every possible low level observation arises from some high level action sequence, and hence from some high level strategy (perform that sequence of actions). Hence if every high level strategy is compatible with every low level observation, then every high level input sequence is compatible with every low level observation. That is, nondeducibility on strategies implies nondeducibility on inputs. In fact the converse holds as well. A very similar result has previously been noted in a process algebraic setting by Focardi and Gorrieri 3 . Theorem 1 could in fact be obtained as a consequence of their results and translation results from state and action observed systems that we present in section 5. Note that, by Wittbold and Johnson's example, the equivalence does not hold in synchronous systems.
Unwinding-Like Properties
A number of the definitions in the literature on noninterference for nondeterministic systems are closely related to notion that was originally motivated as a way of facilitating proofs of noninterference for deterministic systems.
Definition 4. An unwinding relation for a system M ∈ M a is an equivalence relation ∼ L on the states of M satisfying the following conditions, for all states s, t and actions a:
An unwinding relation for a system M ∈ M s is one satisfying Locally Respects,
Step Consistency, and the following variant of Output Consistency.
The relationship between unwinding conditions and noninterference, is given by the following classical results:
If there exists an unwinding relation for
The following is a natural generalization of Definition 4 to nondeterministic systems. (Note that OC has been incorporated into SC in the unwinding relation for M na .) Definition 5. An unwinding relation for a system M ∈ M na is an equivalence relation ∼ L on the states of M such that for all states s, s , t, actions a, and outputs o,
An unwinding relation for a system M ∈ M ns is an equivalence relation satisfying
Several definitions of noninterference can be expressed in terms of this generalized notion of unwinding. The (state observed part) of the following is essentially from [5, 6] . The action observed part is apparently new, and relies on the
Intuitively, this separates states so that they encode agent u's most recent observation, extractable by obs u ((s, f )) = f (u).
Definition 6.
Whereas Definition 6 obtains a definition of noninterference by asserting that a particular relation is unwinding, the following does so by requiring the existence of an unwinding relation.
(M ∈ RES s ), if there exists an unwinding relation for M .
Note the correspondence between this definition and the equivalence, established by Theorem 2, between N I a (N I s ) and the existence of an unwinding on deterministic systems. The use of the term "restrictiveness" in this definition is non-obvious. We justify it when we later discuss work by McCullough [7] , which fits more naturally to the process algebraic definitions treated in Section 5. 
Transformations Between State-Based Models
We now turn, to our main interest in this paper, which is to study the relationship between security properties defined over different semantic models. For this, we require translations between the two types of models. The intuition underlying the two models introduced above, that agents can both act on and observe their environment is the same, and the modelling of the dynamics of actions is very closely related. Thus the major issue in translation is how to deal with the observations. To transform action observed systems into state observed systems is not too difficult:
Here ε 0 is a special output denoting no 'real' output has been observed till this moment. We use the notation f [x → v] for the function g that is identical to f except that g(x) = v.
The intuition of this translation is that the state remembers the most recent output for each agent, and agents obtain this information in their observation of the state. (The price is to blow up the state space for all these observational possibilities.) The range of F as is a proper subset of M ns , because in any F as (M ), for any u, v ∈ D, u can not modify v's observation before v gives any input. It is plain that if M is deterministic, then so is F as (M ), so also F as : M a → M s .
It is also possible to translate state observed systems to action observed systems. An apparent obstacle, however, is that whereas in action-observed systems, an action gives a new observation only to the agent performing the action, an action in a state-observed system may also give a new observation to others. In the following definition, we handle the need to model these additional effects by mapping the state observations to potential observations, that would be obtained if the agent were to look at the state. Thus, we define a translation that equips each agent u with a new action look u that enables the agent to obtain its observation from the current state, without changing that state. Definition 9. Let F sa : M ns → M na be the function such that for each M = S, s 0 , next, obs, A, dom , we have F sa (M ) = S, s 0 , next , A , dom , where:
We note that this translation produces a system with significantly more runs than the original state-observed system. This comes about because agents may, by failing to perform a look action, omit to make an observation they would have made in the state-observed system, or may perform a look action multiple times in the same state. The former, in particular, means that there exist runs in which agents have a "state of information" that would not have occurred in the state observed system. We would not expect, therefore, that all 'information theoretic' properties will be preserved by these translations.
Here we may prove that the properties discussed above correspond under the translations:
Theorem 3. Let P be any of the properties N I, N DI, N DS, BN S, RES. Then 1. for all M ∈ M na , we have M ∈ P a iff F as (M ) ∈ P s , and 2. for all M ∈ M ns , we have M ∈ P s iff F sa (M ) ∈ P a . This result can be understood as confirming the following key intuition concerning security properties and observations: a system is insecure if an agent is able to obtain prohibited information. Thus, modifying a system by permitting additional runs in which agents make fewer observations and uninformative (e.g. repeat) observations does not change the satisfaction of the security property.
Transformations to Process Algebraic Models
Since the development of the original noninterference definitions, research has moved to how these definitions may be generalised to systems defined in process algebra. Work in this area has been conducted within the framework of the process algebra CSP, surveyed in [13] , as well as the framework of a variant called SPA of the process algebra CCS, surveyed in [11] . We focus here on the latter, which it is closer to the models considered above in that it distinguishes inputs and outputs (corresponding loosely to actions and observations). It is also cast in terms of a common semantic underpinning for both the CSP and CSS approaches, viz., labelled transition systems.
Definition 10. A labelled transition system is a quadruple
where L is the set of event labels, P is the set of processes (or states), p 0 is the initial process (or state), and →⊆ P × (L ∪ {τ }) × P is the transition relation.
Write L for the set of all LT Ss.
The corresponding trace of L is the sequence of labels l 1 . . . l n with any occurrences of τ deleted. In CCS, there is also a self-inverse bijection · : L → L and the set of events L is partitioned into a set I of input events and the set O = {a|a ∈ I} of output events. Intuitively, the input event a may synchronise with the output event a when composing processes. We write L IO (I) for the set of all LT S's with inputs I and corresponding set of outputs O = {a|a ∈ I}, or simply L IO when I is clear.
In order to study security definitions, Focardi and Gorrieri [17] enhance CCS by an orthogonal partitioning of the space of events into High and Low events. Combining the two distinctions, the set L of all events is thereby partitioned into High inputs (denoted HI), High outputs (HO), Low inputs (LI) and Low outputs (LO). They call the resulting process calculus SPA.
Apparently, labelled transition systems are more general than the state machine models discussed above, in that inputs are not always enabled. Superficially, SPA's labelled transition systems seem closest to action-observed state machines, inasmuch as both inputs (actions) and outputs (observations) are associated to transitions. Given the equivalences discussed above, we therefore focus on translating action-observed machines into SPA. However, whereas actionobserved machines combine an action and an observation into a single state transition, SPA separates the two notions. This opens the way to several plausible translations from M na to L IO . One approach is to follow an approach like that used above for the translation from M na to M ns , and treats the observations as optional events which do not change the state.
IO be the mapping such that if M = S, s 0 , step, obs, d om, A , we have F al (M ) = P, p 0 , →, L where
Another approach to the translation, which keeps observations obligatory, is to introduce for each state s and action a a new state (s, a) to represent that the action a has been taken from state s, but the corresponding observation has not yet been made. , (s, a) )|s ∈ S, a ∈ A} ∪ { ((s, a) , o, t)|(o, t) ∈ step(s, a)}.
Focardi and Gorrieri discuss the condition of input-totality in the context of relating their definitions of security on SPA processes to classical defintions. An LTS M ∈ L IO (I) is input total if for all s ∈ P and for all a ∈ I, there exists some t ∈ P such that s a −→ t. It is apparent that for all M ∈ M na , the LTS (s, a) . We will discuss below the impact this difference has on the relationship between definitions of security in M na and L IO .
We now state a number of the definitions of security discussed by Focardi and Gorrieri. Given a trace t of an LTS in L IO , we write low (t) for the subsequence of labels in LI ∪ LO, high(t) for the subsequence of labels in HI ∪ HO, and highinput(t) for the subsequence of events in HI.
Definition 13. M ∈ L
IO is secure wrt Nondeterministic Noninterference (M ∈ N N I l ) if for every possible low observation α ∈ low (T (M )), there exists a trace t ∈ T (M ) such that low (t) = α and highinput(t) = is the null sequence.
This definition permits the trace t to contain high outputs. The following stronger definition prohibits this.
Definition 14. M ∈ L
IO is secure wrt Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference (M ∈ SN N I l ) if for every possible low observation α ∈ low (T (M )), there exists a trace t ∈ T (M ) such that low (t) = α and high(t) = is the null sequence.
The following is a formulation of nondeducibility on inputs in L IO .
Definition 15. M ∈ L
IO is secure wrt Nondeducibility on Inputs (M ∈ N DI l ) if for every α ∈ A * H , for every possible low observation β ∈ low (T (M )), there exists a trace t ∈ T (M ) such that low (t) = α and highinput(t) = β.
Finally, we have a definition that is motivated as a generalization of nondeducibility on strategies. This can be phrased 5 in terms of a process composition with synchronization on High events, which we formulate as follows. Given Intuitively, process composition is used here to capture the effect of High executing a strategy in the system M . In effect, the definition compares two different behaviours of High, since the term M represents the effect of High not constraining its behaviour in any way, whereas M || H M represents the behaviors resulting when High restricts its behaviour to one that may synchronise with M .
The range of quantification for M in this definition is arguably too large, since it encompasses processes that may refuse to synchronise with High output events in M , by not having the corresponding input event enabled. Prima facie, it would seem that this is an issue for comparisons with nondeducibility on strategies in the system models discussed above, where there is no way for an agent to refuse an observation. Focardi and Gorrieri also consider the following variant N DCIT , which constrains the LTS's in question to be input-enabled. We define this in terms of a looser notion N DC(IT ) to separate input-totality of the system itself from input-totality of the composed systems. 
Investigating the relationship between the definitions of security in actionobserved systems and L IO , under the transformations defined above, we obtain the following.
Thus, both transformations produce LTS representations of the system that are equivalent with respect to the property of non-deducibility on input. Since non-deducibility on strategies is equivalent to non-deducibility on input on M na , this result gives us a way of checking the former property through a mapping to L IO . However, it remains of interest to check whether the notions of nondeducibility defined on L IO corresponds to that on M na . This is particularly so as FG show that the placement of nondeducibility on composition with respect to the other properties is somewhat sensitive to the class of systems to which it is applied, and the class of systems used in the compositions. FG prove the following relationships:
We add to this the following result about input total systems:
That is, on input-total systems, input-total High processes have the same discriminative powers as all processes. Using fact that F 1 al produces input-total LTS's, the equivalence of N DS a and N DI a and the facts from the previous two propositions, we obtain a direct correspondence between nondeducibility on strategies and several notions of nondeducibility on composition.
This means that on input-total systems, and hence on the range of F 1 al , the distinct notions N DC, N DC(IT ), N DCIT , N DI and N N I collapse. We find a similar correspondence for F 2 al (except that N DCIT is excluded here since F 2 al (M ) is not input-total.)
These results show that under either representation of action-observed systems, there is significant flexibility in the range of quantification of the composed processes in the definition of nondeducibility on composition. Note that there is moreover a difference between N DS a and any of these notions, in that N DS a quantifies over deterministic strategies, a constraint that is not considered in the definitions on labelled transitions systems.
McCullough introduced a property he called restrictiveness, initially using a trace-based semantics, but ultimately settling on a stronger definition in an LTS model without τ transitions. The cleanest presentation of the latter occurs in [20] . Here we present this definition in the same pattern as used for the automaton models above. [17] has proposed a definition of restrictiveness in the context of all LTS's, but in addition to dealing with τ transitions, their definition requires that a distinction be made between high and low level τ transitions, for reasons that are not made clear. Since our translations do not produce LTSs with τ transitions, the above restricted definition suffices for our present purposes.
Further, Focardi and Gorrieri classify their definition of restrictiveness with the other trace-based properties they consider. We point out that a better comparison is with the separate hierarchy of bisimulation based definitions of security they define. The following is one of the notions in this hierarchy. Here, ≈ B is the weak bisimulation, and '\' is the restriction operator, with the usual definitions in CCS [21] .
We may show the following, which justifies the use of the term restrictiveness in Definition 7.
This result (together with Theorem 3) shows that on the state-based models, the (usually quite complicated) definition of restrictiveness has a rather intuitive formulation with a very clear relationship to the classical unwinding theory for noninterference on deterministic state-based systems. Moreover, this notion corresponds exactly with SBNDC. We note that F 2 al does not work in this case because it produces an LTS which is not input-total, and also the translation gives H a chance to create deadlock everywhere.
For completeness, we also characterise the notion BN S [5] discussed above within LTS. Whereas BN S a has a clear intuition associated with it for state observed systems -that Low's future pattern of observations depends only on the current Low state, as captured by its current observation -this intuition, already weakened somewhat in BN S a , becomes much less compelling in LTS, where we may have an arbitrary sequencing of inputs, outputs and internal transitions. (We take this as evidence that it remains of interest to work in less expressive models!) The following definition, patterned after BN S a , suffices for a translation result, however. 
Conclusion
We have studied the relationships between a variety of definitions of noninterference under a number of mappings between different semantic frameworks. Our results show that similar properties in different models do correspond in a precise sense, but highlight some subtleties: e.g., more properties are preserved when the obligatory observations in the state-observed model are treated as optional when mapped to the other models. Of particular interest, given our motivation from operating systems verification, is that the strongest process algebraic notion, SBN DC, is still weaker on the automaton models than the notion BN S s which seems closest to the models and properties used in the operating systems verification literature [15, 16] . However, this literature involves issues such as separation policy, scheduling and synchrony that go beyond asynchronous models and the specific policy L ≤ H we have treated in this paper. We intend to address these issues in future work.
